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Abstract
In a dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous markups and labor market
frictions, we investigate the effects of increased product market competition. Unlike most
macroeconomic models of search, we endogenize the labor supply along the extensive mar-
gin. We show that beneficial effects in labor market outcomes require that the condition
for saddle-path stability must be fulfilled whereas instability yields detrimental effects.
Additionally, we find numerically that most of the decline in the unemployment rate can
be attributed to the increase in the labor force, while the number of job seekers remains
fairly unchanged. For a calibration capturing alternatively European and the U.S. labor
markets, a deregulation episode, which lowers the markup by 3 percentage points, results
in a fall in the unemployment rate by 0.1 and 0.05 percentage point, respectively, while
the labor share is almost unaffected in the long-run.
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1 Introduction
The role of product market reforms in achieving the objective of lower unemployment rate
has recently received a lot of attention amongst policy makers and academics. While the em-
pirical literature finds that poor competition in product markets could be a cause of the poor
performance of European labor markets, the connection between product market regulation
and unemployment has received very little attention from the dynamic general equilibrium
literature, except Ebell and Haefke [2009].1 In particular, the relationship between product
market competition and equilibrium unemployment has been studied by considering a static
framework thus abstracting from dynamic effects (see Blanchard and Giavazzi [2003], Spector
[2004]). As Ebell and Haefke [2009], we use a dynamic general equilibrium model to quantify
the unemployment effect of regulation in goods market. In contrast to Ebell and Heaefke,
we endogenize labor supply along the extensive margin (i.e., the labor force participation
decision) and analyze both the dynamic and steady-state effects analytically. Importantly,
we derive the condition for saddle-path stability and show that detrimental effects on labor
market outcomes may emerge as a consequence of dynamic instability.
There exists a growing body of empirical evidence to support the positive relationship
between product market regulation and the performance of labor markets. At a micro level,
Bertrand and Kramarz [2002] find that French regions which restricted entry (into retailing)
experienced slower rates of job growth. At a macro level, estimates by Bassanini and Duval
[2006] show that stringent anti-competitive product market regulation raises aggregate unem-
ployment, though the impact is much smaller than a reduction in unemployment benefits or
in the tax wedge. Griffith et al. [2007] provide evidence that the product market deregulation
experienced in the 1990s by some OECD countries was associated with a decline in the unem-
ployment rate, particularly in countries with a higher workers’ bargaining power. According
to their findings, a fall of 3 percentage points of the price-cost margin will generate a decrease
in the unemployment rate ranging between 0.6 and 1.1 percentage points as the bargaining
coverage (capturing the worker bargaining power) increases from 53% to 97%.
To explore the dynamic link between product market regulation and unemployment, we
develop a novel framework combining imperfect competition in product markets and unem-
ployment in the labor market. We see our setup as an extension of the framework by Heijdra
and Ligthart [2009] who solve analytically a dynamic open economy model with search unem-
ployment and endogenous labor force participation.2 In the tradition of Diamond-Mortensen-
1Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz [2010] analyze the effect of a deregulation shock within a dynamic general
equilibrium model with entry and exit of firms but they abstract from labor market frictions.
2Our framework also builds upon Merz [1995], Andolfatto [1996], Shi and Wen [1999] who construct dynamic
1
Pissarides, unemployment arises because it takes time for firms to hire workers and for un-
employed workers to find a job. Because firms face a cost by maintaining job vacancies,
they receive a surplus equal to the markup-adjusted marginal product of labor less the prod-
uct wage. Symmetrically, so as to compensate for the cost of searching for a job, unemployed
workers receive a surplus equal to the product wage less the reservation wage. Nash bargaining
between firms and workers yields a product wage defined as the weighted sum of the marginal
product of labor and a reservation wage. As Heijdra and Ligthart, we depart from the usual
practice by assuming endogenous labor force participation which implies that the reservation
wage varies over time. In contrast to Heijdra and Ligthart who assume perfect competition in
product markets, we consider monopolistic competition. Building on Jaimovich and Floetotto
[2008], we assume that only a limited number of intermediate good producers operate within
each sector, so that the price-elasticity of demand and thereby the markup faced by each firm
depends on the number of competitors.3 The markup variation is central to the propagation
mechanism of a deregulation shock.
We contribute to the product market regulation literature in four respects. First, our
setup can be solved analytically and delivers simple formulas which illuminate the role of labor
market institutions in driving the effects of a deregulation episode. Our second contribution is
more technical and relates the stability of the dynamic system to the beneficial effects on labor
market outcomes. Third, we are able to depict the transitional adjustment of key variables
by using simple phase diagrams. Finally, we also provide a novel quantitative exploration, in
particular by estimating the size of the short and long-term effects of a deregulation episode.
We detail below our four contributions.
While using a fully dynamic general equilibrium model, our setup yields simple formulas
which provide predictions related to the role of labor market variables in determining the
size of the effects of a deregulation shock in product markets. In particular, we find that
a deregulation shock lowers unemployment more as labor supply at the extensive margin
is larger, unemployment benefits are smaller, the workers’ bargaining power is higher, and
the product markets are initially not very competitive. Importantly, the combined effect of
endogenous labor force participation, which has been so far ignored by the literature, and
endogenous markups triggers a multiplicative employment effect. The reason is that as more
general equilibrium models with labor markets characterized by search frictions. We depart from these papers
by solving the model analytically and introducing endogenous markups.
3See e.g., Wu and Zhang [2000] and Zhang [2007] who develop dynamic general equilibrium models with
monopolistic competition and free entry, in which price elasticity of demand at firm level (evaluated at sym-
metric equilibria) is proportional to the number of firms in the industry. In contrast to us, they abstract from
imperfect labor markets.
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agents participate in the labor market, employment increases further. As a consequence,
the markup falls by a larger amount which raises labor demand and thereby labor market
tightness. Hence, the reservation wage rises more which increases further the labor force
participation and thereby employment.
Our dynamic model is tractable enough to derive analytically the condition for saddle-
point stability and to fully characterize transitional dynamics. Additionally, we show that
long-term effects on labor market variables crucially depend on the local stability properties
of the dynamical system. If the long-run equilibrium is saddle-path, improving competitive
conditions yields beneficial effects on labor market outcomes. Importantly, we find that
instability arises when product markets are initially too much regulated. In this case, enhanced
competition lowers employment and raises the unemployment rate in the long-run.
In contrast to Heijdra and Lightart [2009], the introduction of endogenous markups re-
stores transitional dynamics for labor market variables. Moreover, we are able to derive
analytically the dynamics and illustrate the transitional adjustment by using phase diagrams.
In particular, employment and labor market tightness co-vary, while employment and the
unemployment rate vary in opposite direction. Interestingly, the unemployment rate unam-
biguously increases on impact as more agents search for a job and employment is initially
predetermined.
While the model can be solved analytically, we propose some numerical simulations to
illustrate key theoretical results and discuss policy implications. In the same spirit as Ebell
and Haefke [2009], we investigate to which extent product market competition decreases
unemployment and increases wages. In this regard, we offer two calibrations of the model,
one aimed at capturing the United States, the other aimed at capturing Europe with its more
“rigid” labor market. Since data show considerable heterogeneity across European Union
members, we conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to pivotal parameters capturing the
regulation of goods and labor markets. In contrast to Ebel and Haefke [2009] who calibrate
their model to quantify the extent to which the poor performance of European labor markets
relative to the U.S. can be attributed to lower competition, we compare the size of the decline
of the unemployment rate in Europe and the U.S. after a deregulation shock of the same
magnitude. To do so, we use panel data for 16 OECD countries over the period 1985-2003.
Our estimates show that when the OECD regulatory index falls by one unit, the subsequent
decline in the markup falls in the range between 2.8 and 3.3 percentage points. Considering
a fall in fixed costs which lowers the markup by 3 percentage points, we find that such a
deregulation episode lowers the unemployment rate by about 0.1 percentage point and raises
3
the Nash bargaining wage by 2.2% for the Europe baseline calibration. These effects increase
substantially in countries with higher worker bargaining power, initial poorly competitive
product markets, or larger elasticity of labor supply at the extensive margin. When the labor
market parameters are chosen so as to match the U.S. economy, it is found that beneficial
effects on labor market outcomes are mitigated.
Finally, as in Blanchard and Giavazzi [2003], we investigate the distribution effect between
labor income and profits triggered by a deregulation episode. We find numerically that the
labor share does not decrease, regardless of the scenario or time horizon. However, whereas
the short-run rise in the labor share falls in the range between 0.2 and 1.5 percentage points
of GDP, the long-term effects are almost insignificant.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop an open
economy model with endogenous markup stemming from a limited number of competitors
within each industry and unemployment arising from matching frictions. Section 3 analyzes
equilibrium dynamics and steady-state. Section 4 provides an analytical exploration of the
transmission of a deregulation shock. In Section 5, we report results from numerical simula-
tions and discuss the role of labor and product market parameters. Section 6 summarizes our
main results and concludes.
2 The Framework
We look at a small open economy which faces a given world interest rate, r? and is populated
by a constant number of identical households and firms that have perfect foresight and live
forever. Households decide on labor market participation and consumption while firms decide
on hours worked. The economy contains a large number of sectors. Within each sector,
there are a limited number of monopolistically competitive intermediate firms who produce
differentiated goods. Hence, within a given sector, the price-elasticity of demand faced by
each firm depends on the number of competitors, which results in an endogenous markup.
Each firm produces a unique variety by renting labor services from an employment agency.
The labor market, in the tradition of Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides, consists of a matching
process between the employment agency who posts job vacancies and unemployed workers
who search for a job. Finally, differentiated goods are aggregated into a sectoral good and a
perfectly competitive firm aggregates sectoral goods to produce a final good. The final good
can be exported or consumed domestically, or can cover both fixed cost and cost of recruiting.4
4More details on the model as well as the derivations of the results which are stated below are provided in
a Technical Appendix which is available on request.
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2.1 Households
The economy that we consider consists of a representative household with a measure one
continuum of identical infinitely lived members. At any instant, members in the household
derive utility from consumption goods C and experience disutility from working and searching
efforts. More precisely, the representative household comprises members who engage in only
one of the following activities: working, searching a job, or enjoying leisure. Assuming that the
representative individual is endowed with one unit of time, leisure is defined as l ≡ 1−L−U ,
where L denotes units of labor time and U corresponds to time spent on searching for a
job. Hence, the labor force is not constant which enables us to focus on both the transition
between employment and unemployment on the one hand, and the transition between leisure
and labor force on the other. Unemployed agents are randomly matched with job vacancies
according to a matching function described later. Since the timing of a match is random,
agents face idiosyncratic risks. To simplify the analysis, we assume that members in the
household perfectly insure each other against variations in labor income. The representative
household chooses the time path of consumption and labor force to maximize the following
objective function:5
Υ(t) =
∫ ∞
0
[logX(t)] e−ρtdt, X ≡ C − L
1+1/σL
P
1 + 1/σL
, (1)
with ρ the consumer’s subjective time discount rate. For later use, we denote by u the
unemployment rate defined as u = UU+L =
U
LP
with LP = L+ U the labor force.
At each instant of time, mU unemployed agents find a job and sL employed individuals
lose their job. Employment evolves gradually according to:
L˙(t) = mU(t)− sL(t), (2)
where m denotes the rate at which unemployed agents find jobs and s is the constant rate of
job separation; 1/m can be interpreted as the average unemployment duration; m is a function
of labor market tightness θ which is defined as the ratio of the number of job vacancies over
unemployed agents in the economy.
Households supply L(t) units of labor services for which they receive the product wage
w(t). They accumulate internationally traded bonds, B(t), that yield net interest rate earnings
r?B(t). We denote by A(t) the stock of financial wealth held by households which comprises
the shadow value of employment defined later. Denoting by T the lump-sum taxes, the flow
5Following Greenwood et al. [1988], the sub-utility functional form is specified so as to eliminate the wealth
effect in the household’s labor force participation decision.
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budget constraint is equal to households’ real disposable income less consumption expenditure
C:
A˙(t) = r?A(t) + w(t)L(t) +BUU(t)− T (t)− C(t), (3)
where BU represents unemployment benefits received by job seekers.
The representative household selects consumption, time dedicated for searching a job, and
financial wealth:
1
X
= λ, (4a)
L
1/σL
P = m (θ) ξ +B
U , (4b)
λ˙ = λ (ρ− r?) , (4c)
ξ˙ = (s+ r?) ξ − [vLP + w] , (4d)
where λ and ξ denote the shadow prices of wealth and finding a job, respectively. Eq. (4b)
asserts that the opportunity cost of search to be equal to the marginal benefit of search where
the quantity L1/σLP can be viewed as being the worker’s reservation wage.
Equation (4a) can be solved for consumption:
C = C
(
λ¯, L, U
)
. (5)
with CL = CU = L
1/σL
P > 0, Cλ¯ = −X/λ < 0. Finally, we require the time preference rate
ρ to be equal to the world interest rate r? in order to generate an interior solution. This
standard assumption in an open economy setting implies that the marginal utility of wealth,
λ, must remain constant over time, i. e. λ = λ¯.
2.2 Firms
Final output, Y , is produced in a competitive retail sector using a constant-returns-to-scale
production function which aggregates a measure one continuum of sectoral goods:
Y =
[∫ 1
0
(Qj)
ω−1
ω dj
] ω
ω−1
, (6)
where ω > 0 represents the elasticity of substitution between any two different sectoral goods
and Qj stands for intermediate consumption of sector j variety. The final good producers
behave competitively, and the households use the final good for consumption.
Denoting by P the price of the final output and Pj the price of the jth sectoral good, the
profit of the final good producer is given by:
piF = P
[∫ 1
0
(Qj)
ω−1
ω dj
] ω
ω−1
−
∫ 1
0
PjQjdj. (7)
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Solving the maximization problem, we obtain the demand for each intermediate input:
Qj =
(Pj
P
)−²
Y, (8)
where the price of the final output is given by:
P =
(∫ 1
0
P1−²j dj
) 1
1−²
. (9)
In each of the j sectors, there are N > 1 firms producing differentiated goods that are
aggregated into a sectoral good by a CES aggregating function. The output of sectoral good
j is given by:6
Qj = N−
1
²−1
[∫ N
0
(Xi,j)
²−1
² di
] ²
²−1
, (10)
where Xi,j stands for output of firm i in sector j and ² is the elasticity of substitution between
any two varieties.
Denoting by Pi,j the price of good i in sector j, the profit function for the jth sector good
producer denoted by piSj is:
piSj = PjN−
1
²−1
(∫ N
0
(Xi,j)
²−1
² di
) ²
²−1
−
∫ N
0
Pi,jXi,jdi. (11)
The demand faced by each producer Xi,j is:
Xi,j =
(Pi,j
Pj
)−² Qj
N
, (12)
and the price index of sector j is given by:
Pj = N−
1
1−²
(∫ N
0
P1−²i,j di
) 1
1−²
. (13)
Combining (8) and (12), the demand for variety Xi,j can be expressed in terms of the
relative price of the final good:
Xi,j =
(Pi,j
Pj
)−²(Pj
P
)−ω Y
N
. (14)
Intermediate output Xi,j is produced using labor Li,j :
Xi,j = Li,j . (15)
As it is common in the literature, we assume that the production function is linear in labor.7
6By having the term N−
1
²−1 in (10), the analysis abstracts from the variety effect and concentrates solely
on the effects of markup variation.
7We discuss the implications of decreasing returns to scale in labor for steady-state changes in a Technical
Appendix available from the authors. We find that our results remain unchanged qualitatively.
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To avoid an interaction between hiring costs and market power, we break up the hiring
decision by assuming that each intermediate producer uses labor services at a costW paid to
an employment agency which negotiates wages at a rate w with the new hires.8 As intermedi-
ate good producers face a labor cost W per employee, the profit function of the intermediate
good producer i in sector j denoted by piPi,j is:
piPi,j = Pi,jLi,j −WLi,j − Pϕ, (16)
where ϕ corresponds to fixed costs measured in terms of the final good. Denoting by e the
price-elasticity of demand and by µ the mark-up with µ ≡ ee−1 , the first-order condition reads:
Pi,j 1
µ
=W. (17)
We consider a symmetric equilibrium where all firms in the intermediate good sector
produce the output level Xi,j = X with the same quantity of labor Li,j = L, set the same
price Pi,j = P, and have the same gross profits piPi,j = piP . Considering the final good as the
numeraire and normalizing its price to one, we have P = P = 1. In equilibrium, eq. (17)
rewrites as:
1
µ
=W. (18)
According to the Dixit and Stiglitz [1977] assumption, the number of competitors is large
enough within each sector to yield a fixed price-elasticity of demand. Yet, as emphasized
by Yang and Heijdra [1993], this assumption is an approximation when the final good is
aggregated by a finite number of intermediate goods. We depart from the usual practice,
following Gal´ı [1995], in assuming that the number of firms is large enough so that we can
ignore the strategic effects but not so large that the effect of entry is minuscule on the firm’s
demand curve. Consequently, the price elasticity of demand faced by a single firm is no longer
constant and equal to the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties, but rather a
function of the number of firms N . Taking into account that output of one variety does
not affect the general price index P , but influences the sectoral price level, in a symmetric
equilibrium, the resulting price elasticity of demand is:9
e (N) = ²− (²− ω)
N
, N ∈ (1,∞) . (19)
Assuming that ² > ω (see Jaimovich and Floetotto [2008]), the price elasticity of demand
faced by one single firm is an increasing function of the number of firms N within a sector.
8Hence, each intermediate good producer acts as a seller in a monopolistically competitive market while in
the labor market, it rents labor services from an employment agency which posts vacancies to hire workers.
This allows us to keep the surplus from the hiring decision separate from the profits of a firm (that signal entry
into the industry).
9Details of derivation can be found in the Technical Appendix.
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Henceforth, the markup µ = ee−1 decreases as the number of competitors increases, i.e. µN <
0.
2.3 Hiring
We assume that an employment agency is aimed at posting vacancies and hiring workers.
This employment agency receives the markup adjusted marginal product of labor and pays
the wage w decided by the generalized Nash bargaining solution. The human resource agency
maintains job vacancies V to hire workers, at a cost per vacancy κ which is assumed to be
constant and measured in terms of the final good (with P = 1). The profit of the employment
agency denoted by ΠH is:
ΠH ≡WL− wL− κV, (20)
where L is aggregate labor, i.e. L = nL. Denoting by f the rate at which a vacancy is
matched with unemployed agents, the law of motion for aggregate labor is given by:
L˙ = f (θ)V − sL, (21)
where fV represents the flow of job vacancies which are fulfilled; f decreases with labor
tightness θ.
Denoting by γ the shadow price of employment to the employment agency, and keeping
in mind that f is taken as given, the maximization problem yields the following first-order
conditions:
γ =
κ
f (θ)
, (22a)
γ˙ = γ (r? + s)− (W− w) . (22b)
Eq. (22a) requires the marginal cost of vacancy, κ, to be equal to the marginal benefit of
vacancy, f (.) γ. Solving equation (22b) forward and invoking the transversality condition
yields:
γ(t) =
∫ ∞
t
[
1
µ
− w (τ))
]
e(s+r
?)(t−τ)dτ. (23)
Eq. (23) states that γ is equal to the present value of the cash flow 1µ − w discounted at a
rate s+ r?.
2.4 Matching and Wage Determination
We now set the matching function and the wage determination scheme. As it is common in
the literature, the matching function is assumed to take a Cobb-Douglas form:
M (V,U) =M0V αV U1−αV , αV ∈ (0, 1) , (24)
9
where M describes the number of job matches and αV represents the elasticity of vacancies
in job matches. We express the number of labor contracts per unemployment units:
m = m (θ) =M0θαV , f = f (θ) =
m (θ)
θ
=M0θαV −1, (25)
with
f ′θ
f
= − (1− αV ) , m
′θ
m
= αV . (26)
When a vacancy and a job-seeking worker meet, a rent is created which is equal to ξ + γ,
where ξ is the value of an additional job and γ is the value of an additional worker. The
division of the rent between the worker and employment agency is determined by generalized
Nash bargaining over the wage rate:
max
w
(ξ)αW (γ)1−αW , αW ∈ (0, 1) , (27)
where αW and 1 − αW correspond to the bargaining power of the worker and the firm,
respectively.
Solving for (27), the product wage w is defined as a weighted sum of the markup-adjusted
labor marginal product and the reservation wage:
w = αW
1
µ
+ (1− αW )L1/σLP . (28)
A fall in the markup, which exerts an upward pressure on labor demand (see eq. (18)), or a
rise in the labor market tightness, by raising the reservation wage (see eq. (4b)), pushes up
the product wage.
2.5 Free Entry and the Number of Firms
In investigating the effects of deregulation in product markets, we impose the simplifying
assumption of static entry decisions. This assumption is made to ensure almost closed form
solutions and the derivation of easily interpretable expressions.10
Since at each instant, new intermediate good producers may enter and produce a new vari-
ety, each intermediate-good producer makes zero-profit. The zero-profit condition determines
the number of firms:
N =
L
ϕ
[
1− 1
µ (N)
]
, (29)
10We assume instantaneous entry to keep analytical tractability. In a Technical Appendix available on request
from the authors, we show that introducing a cost of entry does not modify our main results. Additionally,
because transitional dynamics cannot be analyzed analytically, we assume instantaneous entry which allows us
to study the transitional adjustment by using phase diagrams.
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where L is aggregate stock of employment which is equal to aggregate output, i.e. Y = L.
The zero profit condition can be solved for the number of intermediate producers:
N = N (L,ϕ) , (30)
where NL > 0, Nϕ < 0. A rise in employment lowers the average cost which provides an
incentive for firms to enter the market. By contrast, an increase in fixed costs reduces the
number of firms by reducing profit opportunities.
Finally, summing profits in the intermediary producer sector and of the employment
agency, we have:
Π = NpiP +ΠH = L− wL− κV −Nϕ, (31)
where L−Nϕ = L/µ (N). As it shall become clear later, this relationship will be useful when
analyzing the behavior of the labor share.
2.6 Government
The final agent in the economy is the government. Unemployed benefits BUU are covered by
lump-sum taxes T according to the following balanced budget constraint:
BUU = T, (32)
where we abstract from government spending for simplicity.11
3 Solving the Model
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium dynamics and then discuss the steady-state.
3.1 Saddle-Path Stability
In this subsection, we analyze saddle-path stability; hence, we first derive the system of
differential equations.
Linearized System
Differentiating first (4b) w. r. t. time and substituting (4d) yields the dynamic equation
for job seekers:
1
σL
(LP )
1
σL
−1
U˙ =
(
L
1/σL
P −BU
)[
(s+ r?) + αV
θ˙
θ
]
−m (θ)
(
w − L1/σLP
)
− 1
σL
(LP )
1
σL
−1
L˙,
(33)
11Government spending G is considered in the numerical analysis for calibration purpose. Hence, eq. (32)
rewrites as BUU +G = T .
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where we used the fact that m (θ) ξ =
(
L
1/σL
P −BU
)
.
Differentiating eq. (22a) w. r. t. time, substituting into eq. (22b), and eliminating γ by
using (22a), yields the dynamic equation for labor market tightness θ:
θ˙(t) =
θ(t)
(1− αV )
{
(s+ r?)− f (θ) (1− αW )
κ
Ψ
}
, (34)
where Ψ is the rent created when a job vacancy and a job-seeking worker meet, and is defined
as
Ψ ≡ Ψ(L(t), U(t), ϕ) = 1
µ (N(t))
− (L(t) + U(t))1/σL . (35)
Linearizing in the neighborhood of the steady-state, and denoting steady-state values with
a tilde, the dynamic system which comprises three equations, i.e. the accumulation equation
for employment (2), the dynamic equation for labor market tightness (34) and the dynamic
equation for job seekers (33), writes in matrix form:(
L˙, θ˙, U˙
)T
= J
(
L(t)− L˜, θ(t)− θ˜, U(t)− U˜
)T
, (36)
where the Jacobian matrix J is given by:
J ≡

−s m′U˜ m
(
θ˜
)
−1−αW1−αV m˜κ Ψ˜L (s+ r?) −
1−αW
1−αV
m˜
κ Ψ˜U
(2s+ r?) + αW m˜Ψ˜L1−αV
L˜P σL
(L˜P )1/σL
−m′U˜ (s+ r?)− m˜+ αW m˜1−αV
 . (37)
For analytical simplicity, we assume that the Hosios condition holds, i. e. αV = 1− αW .
Under these assumptions, the Trace and Determinant of the Jacobian matrix are12
Tr J = (s+ r?) + r?, (38a)
Det J = − (s+ m˜) (s+ r?)2
{
(s+ m˜+ r?)
(s+ r?)
+
ηµ,NηN,L
µ
(αV u˜+ σLχ˜)
(1− αV ) Ψ˜
}
≶ 0, (38b)
where χ˜ =
αW m˜Ψ˜
s+r?
(L˜P )1/σL
represents the share of the surplus associated with a labor contract in
the marginal benefit of search, ηµ,N < 0 is the elasticity of the markup to entry and ηN,L > 0
the elasticity of entry to employment.
Condition for Saddle-Path Stability
We now derive the saddle-path stability condition and show that the price-elasticity of
demand plays a pivotal role in producing potential dynamic instability. Denoting by ν the
eigenvalue, the characteristic equation for the matrix J (37) of the linearized system is given
by:
(s+ r? − νi)
{
ν2i − r?νi +
DetJ
s+ r?
}
= 0. (39)
12We show in a Technical Appendix available upon request from the authors that imposing the Hosios
condition does not affect our main results. We set αV = 1− αW only for clarity purpose.
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Saddle-path stability requires DetJs+r? < 0. Hence, the following inequality must hold:
(1− αV ) Ψ˜ + αW m˜Ψ˜s+r?
−ηµ,NηN,Lµ
> (αV u˜+ σLχ˜) . (40)
The trivial special case of exogenous markup implies that ηµ,N = 0 and thereby the inequality
(40) above unambiguously holds. If the markup is endogenous, the sign of eq. (40) is not
clear-cut and relies in particular upon the intensity of competition. To see it formally, let
rewrite −ηµ,NηN,L/µ˜ as follows:13
−ηµ,NηN,L
µ˜
=
1
e
− 1
²
=
1
µ˜
∣∣∣∣
N large
− 1
µ˜
∣∣∣∣
N limited
. (41)
As shown by the RHS of eq. (41), the elasticity of the markup to employment is larger when
the intensity of competition is initially low, i.e. µ˜|N limited is high.14 As a consequence, the
saddle-path stability condition is less likely to be fulfilled as the denominator on the LHS of
eq. (40) is large. Provided that the intensity of competition is initially high enough, i.e. the
number of competitors N is not too small and thereby µ is not too high, the elasticity of
the markup to firm entry is not too large. In this case, inequality (40) is fulfilled and the
long-run equilibrium is saddle-path. Beside the intensity of competition in product markets,
additional parameters influence the saddle-path stability condition. As shown by the RHS
term of inequality (40), the smaller the initial steady-state unemployment rate, u˜, the less
responsive labor supply (i.e. the lower σL), the smaller the worker bargaining power or the
larger unemployment benefits (i.e. the lower χ˜), the more likely the condition for saddle-path
stability holds.
As long as inequality (40) holds, the linearized dynamic system possesses one negative
eigenvalue denoted by ν1 and two positive eigenvalues denoted by ν2 and ν3. Since the
number of predetermined variables (L) equals the number of negative eigenvalues and the
number of jump variables (θ and U) equals the number of positive eigenvalues, the dynamic
system exhibits a saddle-point behavior. Eigenvalues satisfy:
ν1 < 0 < r? < ν2 < ν3 = s+ r?, (42)
and ν2 = r? − ν1 > 0.
If inequality (40) does not hold, the determinant of the Jacobian matrix becomes positive,
implying that the two characteristic roots ν1 and ν2 have positive real parts. Hence, the dy-
namic system is locally unstable, and the solutions consistent with an equilibrium converging
to the long-run equilibrium is the steady state, i.e. L(t) = L˜, θ(t) = θ˜ and U(t) = U˜ .
13It can be shown that the term −ηµ,NηN,L/µ˜ is equal to 1/e˜ − 1/². By adding and subtracting 1, and
remembering that µ˜ = e˜
e˜−1 if the number of competitors is limited or µ˜ =
²
²−1 if the number of competitors is
large, as in the Dixit-Stiglitz specification, we get (41).
14More precisely, as N decreases, the gap between 1/e and 1/² increases so that − ηµ,NηN,L
µ
becomes large.
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Stable Solutions
The stable paths for employment, labor market tightness, and job seekers are given by :
L(t)− L˜ = A1eν1t, θ(t)− θ˜ = ω12A1eν1t, U(t)− U˜ = ω13A1eν1t, (43)
where we normalized ω11 to unity and elements ω
1
2 and ω
1
3 of the eigenvector (associated with
the stable eigenvalue ν1) are:
ω12 =
(2s+ r?) + (s+ r? − νi)
(
s+νi
m˜
)
+ m˜Ψ˜L
Ψ˜U
m′U˜
m˜ (s+ m˜+ r
? − νi)
, (44a)
ω13 =
(
s+ ν1
m˜
)
− m
′U˜
m˜
ω12. (44b)
The signs of (44) will be determined later.
3.2 Intertemporal Solvency Condition
Using the definition of the stock of financial wealth A(t) ≡ B(t) + γ(t)L(t), differentiating
with respect to time, substituting the accumulation equation of financial wealth and of labor,
i.e. eqs. (3) and (2), together with the dynamic equation for the shadow value of an addi-
tional worker (22b), using the government budget constraint (see eq. (32)), the accumulation
equation for foreign assets is:
B˙(t) = r?B(t) +
L(t)
µ (N(t))
− C(t)− κV (t). (45)
where Y (t) = L(t)µ(N(t)) corresponds to output net of fixed costs.
The solution for B(t) consistent with the intertemporal budget constraint for the open
economy:15
B(t)− B˜ = Φ
(
L(t)− L˜
)
, (46)
where Φ ≡ Λµ1−r? with Λ =
(
1−ηµ,NηN,L
µ˜
)
− κU˜ω12 +
(
vLP − κθ˜
)
ω13. We are not able to
sign Φ; yet, for all parametrization, numerical results yield Φ < 0. The reason is that an
increase in employment raises the marginal benefit from hiring (and thereby the shadow
price γ), which in turn induces agents to switch investment from foreign assets to labor
(i.e. shares on employment agency). As a result, the current account is negatively related
to changes in employment. The linear approximation of the open economy’s intertemporal
budget constraint is:
B˜ −B0 = Φ
(
L˜− L0
)
. (47)
15Substituting first the short-run static solutions for the number of firms and consumption into (45), lineariz-
ing around the steady-state, substituting the solutions for L(t), U(t) and θ(t), and invoking the transversality
condition, yields eq. (46).
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According to (47), the long-run accumulation of employment triggers a long-run fall in foreign
bonds holding.
3.3 Steady-State
We now describe the steady-state of the economy which comprises six equations. First, the
zero-profit condition describes the long-run relationship between the number of firms and
both steady-state labor and fixed costs:
ϕ
L˜
=
1
²
(
N˜ − 1
)
+ ω
. (48)
Since the RHS term of eq. (48) decreases as N˜ rises, a fall in fixed costs or a rise in employment
raises the steady-state number of firms.
Second, setting θ˙ = 0 into eq. (34), we obtain the vacancy creation equation:
κ
f
(
θ˜
) = (1− αW )
s+ r?
 1
µ
(
N˜
) − (L˜+ U˜)1/σL
 (49)
The LHS term of eq. (49) represents the marginal cost of recruiting. The RHS term represents
the marginal benefit of an additional worker which is equal to the share, received by the
employment agency, of the rent created by the encounter between a vacancy and a job-seeking
worker. Keeping the labor force L˜P = L˜ + U˜ fixed, a rise in the number of firms raises the
marginal benefit of an additional worker which thereby triggers a long-run increase in labor
tightness as the employment agency is induced to post more job vacancies.
Third, using the fact that ξ˜ = αW1−αW γ˜, γ˜ =
κ
f˜
, and m˜
f˜
= θ˜ to rewrite the reservation wage,
the decision of search equation reads as:(
L˜+ U˜
)1/σL
=
[
αW
1− αW κθ˜ +B
U
]
. (50)
The LHS term of eq. (50) represents the disutility from entering the labor force. The RHS
term corresponds to the reservation wage. Since higher labor market tightness increases
the probability of hiring and thereby raises the reservation wage, labor force unambiguously
increases.
Fourth, setting L˙ = 0 into eq. (2) implies that the flow of unemployed workers who find
a job is equalized with the flow of employed workers who lose their job. Using the definition
of the labor force, we obtain the standard negative relationship between the unemployment
rate and labor market tightness:
u˜ =
s
s+ m˜
. (51)
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Hence, by raising the probability of finding a job, increased labor market tightness lowers the
unemployment rate in the long-run.
Fifth, substituting first the short-run static solution for consumption and setting B˙ = 0
into eq. (45), we obtain the zero current account equation:
r?B˜ +
L˜
µ
(
N˜
) − C (λ¯, L˜, U˜)− κU˜ θ˜ = 0, (52)
where L˜µ˜ − C˜ − κU˜ θ˜ represents exports.
Finally, the intertemporal solvency condition (47) can be solved for the equilibrium value
of the marginal utility of wealth:16
λ¯ = λ (ϕ) . (53)
Beside the labor force, steady-state consumption is affected by the change in the equilibrium
value of the marginal utility of wealth.
3.4 Graphical Apparatus
In order to facilitate the discussion of the model, the steady-state is summarized graphically.
Focusing mainly on labor market variables, system (48)-(51) can be reduced to two equations.
More precisely, eq. (48) solves for a unique number of firms N˜ = N
(
L˜, ϕ
)
while eq. (51),
which can be restated as sL˜ = m˜U˜ , enables us to express unemployed workers as a function
of employment and labor tightness, i.e. U˜ = sL˜m˜ . Substituting these functions into eq. (49)
and eq. (50) yields:
L˜ =
m˜
m˜+ s
[
αW
1− αW κθ˜ +B
U
]1/σL
, (54a)
κ
f
(
θ˜
) = (1− αW )
s+ r?
 1µ [N (L˜, ϕ)] −
[
αW
1− αW κθ˜ +B
U
] . (54b)
This system jointly determines steady-state employment and labor market tightness and is
summarized graphically by Figure 1(a) that depicts the logarithm form of the system in the
(θ, L)-space.
The first eq. (54a) represents the decision of search schedule (henceforth DS) which is
upward-sloping in the (θ, L)-space. The reason is that a rise in the labor market tightness
16It is worthwhile noticing that the system comprising eqs. (48)-(51) can be solved for the steady-state
number of firms, labor market tightness, employment and job seekers. All these variables can be expressed
in terms of fixed costs, i.e. L˜ = L (ϕ), θ˜ = θ (ϕ), U˜ = U (ϕ), N˜ = N (ϕ). Substituting these equations into
(52), we can solve for the stock of foreign assets as a function of the shadow value of wealth and fixed costs:
B˜ = B
(
λ¯, ϕ
)
. Finally, plugging B˜ = B
(
λ¯, ϕ
)
and L˜ = L (ϕ) into eq. (47) yields (53).
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raises the probability of finding a job and thereby the reservation wage. Hence, a worker gets
a larger share of the surplus associated with a labor contract via higher wage, and thereby is
induced to supply more labor.
The second eq. (54b) represents the vacancy creation schedule (henceforth V C) which is
upward-sloping in the (θ, L)-space. The reason is that a rise in the labor market tightness
raises the average cost of hiring together with the reservation wage which reduces the surplus
from hiring. Hence, to compensate for higher cost and reduced surplus, employment must
increase which triggers firm entry and thereby lowers the markup. As long as the condition
for saddle-path stability holds, i.e. inequality (40) is satisfied, it can be proven formally that
the V C-schedule is steeper than the DS-schedule.17
The intersection, denoted by point E, gives the unique solution for steady state labor
market tightness θ˜ and employment L˜. The slope of the stable branch described by eq. (44a)
in the (θ, L)-space is ambiguous. If inequality (40) holds, the slope of the stable branch labelled
SS is positive and steeper than the locus θ˙ = 0, as illustrated in Figure 1(a).18 Hence, as the
economy moves along the SS path to reach the steady-state E, labor market and employment
co-vary. Let assume that initially, the economy starts with a stock of employment L0 smaller
than L˜. As employment increases, the markup falls which raises the overall surplus from
hiring. As a consequence, the employment agency posts job vacancies which raises labor
market tightness.
At this stage, we can provide intuition regarding the saddle-path stability condition.
Graphically, if inequality (40) does not hold, the branch SS becomes flatter than the locus
θ˙ = 0 which is less steep than the locus L˙ = 0. Hence, as employment increases, the sub-
sequent rise in the labor market tightness becomes so large that the resulting higher cost of
recruiting cannot be longer offset by the drop in the markup. As a consequence, the economy
moves away from the steady-state. More precisely, the condition for instability is associated
with a low price-elasticity of demand so that the elasticity of the markup with respect to the
17Formally, we have:
0 <
ˆ˜L
ˆ˜
θ
∣∣∣∣
L˙=0
= [αV u˜+ σLχ˜] <
ˆ˜L
ˆ˜
θ
∣∣∣∣
θ˙=0
=
[
(1− αV ) Ψ˜ +
(
L˜P
)1/σL
χ˜
]
− ηµ,NηN,L
µ˜
.
18Denoting by a hat the rate of change relative to initial steady-state, the slope of the stable branch in the
(θ, L)-space can be written as:
Lˆ(t)
θˆ(t)
∣∣∣∣
SS
=
1
ω12
θ˜
L˜
=
(s+m˜+r?−µ1)
(s+r?)
(1− αV ) Ψ˜
− ηµ,NηN,L
µ
.
Since
(s+m˜+r?−µ1)
(s+r?)
>
(s+m˜+r?)
(s+r?)
, the SS-schedule is steeper than the V C-schedule in the (θ, L)-space.
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flow of entry is large. As a consequence, the successive waves of increased labor demand and
job vacancies along the transitional path triggers a destabilizing adjustment by raising the
marginal cost of hiring above its marginal benefit.19 To prevent such destabilizing dynamics,
all labor market variables must jump instantaneously to a new steady-state. In contrast to
the case of a saddle-path long-run equilibrium, a fall in fixed cost has detrimental effects on
labor-market outcomes when the system is unstable: employment and labor market tightness
jump immediately to lower steady-state levels. Since the markup is very sensitive to entry,
intermediate-good producers find it optimal to lower immediately the firm size by cutting
employment.20 As profit opportunities decline sharply, the steady-state number of firms is
smaller and thereby the markup rises in the long-run. Additionally, the long-run fall in the
surplus from hiring results in a smaller labor market tightness as the employment agency is
induced to post less job vacancies.
The labor market can alternatively be summarized graphically in the (u, L)-space as shown
in Figure 1(b). Using eq. (51), we find a negative relationship between the steady-state
unemployment rate and labor market tightness. Hence, both the locus L˙ = 0 and θ˙ = 0
display a negative slope in the (u, L)-space. As long as inequality (40) holds, the V C-schedule
is steeper than the DS-schedule in the (u, L)-space. Additionally, as illustrated in Figure
1(b), the stable branch labelled XX is downward-sloping but flatter than the DS-schedule.
Along the stable transitional path, employment and the unemployment rate vary in opposite
direction. The reason is that a rise in hours worked raises the employment rate l ≡ L/LP
which in turn lowers the unemployment rate u.
———————————————————————-
< Please insert Figure 1 about here >
———————————————————————-
4 Deregulation Shock: An Analytical Exploration
In this section, we explore the macroeconomic effects of a deregulation shock, i. e. a fall in
fixed costs, with a focus on labor market variables.21
19The flow of entry is so large that employment and labor market tightness would increase indefinitely.
20Intermediate-good produces know perfectly that raising employment creates profit opportunities which
yield entry along the transitional path. To prevent entry, they produce less and thereby reduce firm size.
21Because fixed costs lower firm entry by reducing profit opportunities, such recurring costs act like a cost
of entry. As stressed previously, whereas the introduction of a cost of entry would leave unchanged our main
results, the dynamics could no longer be analyzed analytically, making use of phase diagrams. Both analytical
and numerical results for the firm entry-exit model are available on request from the authors.
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Denoting by a hat the rate of change relative to initial steady-state, the long-run effects
of a deregulation shock in product markets are ambiguous:22
ˆ˜L
ϕˆ
=
ηµ,NηN,L
µ˜ [αV u˜+ σLχ˜][
(1− αV ) Ψ˜ +
(
L˜P
)1/σL
χ˜
]
+ ηµ,NηN,Lµ˜ [αV u˜+ σLχ˜]
≷ 0, (55a)
ˆ˜
θ
ϕˆ
=
ηµ,NηN,L
µ˜[
(1− αV ) Ψ˜ +
(
L˜P
)1/σL
χ˜
]
+ ηµ,NηN,Lµ˜ [αV u˜+ σLχ˜]
≷ 0, (55b)
where Ψ˜ > 0, χ˜ > 0, ηµ,N < 0 and ηN,L > 0.
In a polar case where the markup is fixed, then ηµ,N = 0 and both steady-state employment
and labor market tightness remain unaffected by the drop in ϕ.
When the markup is negatively correlated with the number of competitors, depending on
whether the saddle-path stability condition holds or not, a fall in fixed costs raises or lowers
employment. If inequality (40) is fulfilled, i.e. the intensity of competition is initially not too
low, as illustrated in Figure 2(a), a drop in fixed costs shifts to the right the V C-schedule
which raises both θ˜ and L˜.
A drop in ϕ has more beneficial effects in labor market outcomes as the elasticity of labor
force σL is higher. Graphically, raising σL rotates to the left the DS-schedule. Hence, a
deregulation shock raises further L˜ and θ˜ as the V C-schedule moves along a steeper locus
L˙ = 0. The reason is that for a given increase in the reservation wage triggered by the rise in
θ˜, households are more willing to join the labor force. Hence, employment increases further.
Two additional labor market parameters play a pivotal role: the worker bargaining power
αW and unemployment benefits BU . A higher αW and/or a smaller BU rotates to the left
the DS-schedule by raising the share of the surplus associated with a labor contract in the
marginal benefit of search χ˜. Hence agents are more willing to join the labor force which in
turn raises further employment.
Initial labor market conditions and product market competition also influence the size of
the long-run effects of a deregulation shock. Inspection of eq. (55a) shows that countries hav-
ing initially higher unemployment rate u˜ and poorly competitive product markets as captured
by a larger markup µ˜ will experience a larger increase in employment. Graphically, raising
u˜ rotates to the left the DS-schedule. The reason is that a higher unemployment rate must
be associated with a smaller θ˜ which implies a stronger reaction of employment to a given
change in the reservation wage. Poor competitive conditions in the product markets lead to
a smaller number of competitors and thereby a larger elasticity of the markup to firm entry
22The signs of eqs. (55a)-(55b) are not clear-cut since the denominator can be negative or positive, while
the numerator is unambiguously negative.
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(see eq. (41)). Hence, labor market tightness increases more following a deregulation shock,
and employment as well. Graphically, raising µ˜ rotates to the right the V C-schedule which
becomes less steep.
We turn now to the transitional dynamics which are illustrated in Figures 2(a) and 2(b).
By reducing average costs, a fall in fixed costs ϕ fosters firm entry and thereby raises the
number of firms. As intermediate good producers perceive a more elastic demand, as reflected
by a decline in the markup, they are induced to produce more by renting additional labor
services. Higher labor demand raises the marginal cost of labor services W. Because the
surplus from hiring increases, the employment agency posts additional job vacancies which in
turn raises the labor market tightness on impact. The economy moves instantaneously from
E0 to point E′, as displayed in Figure 2(a). The consecutive increase in the reservation wage
provides an incentive to enter the labor force. Hence, the number of job seekers increases.
Since labor is a state variable and thereby is initially predetermined, the unemployment rate
increases abruptly from u˜0 to u (0) as the economy moves from F0 to F ′ (see Figure 2(b)).
Over time, employment builds up which reduces further average costs and triggers additional
firm entry. As labor demand increases, the surplus from hiring rises further. Hence, the
employment agency posts additional job vacancies. As a consequence, as stressed previously,
employment and labor market co-move along the transitional path SS. In the same time,
the number of job seekers declines after its initial rise because increased employment raises
the marginal cost of search, i.e. the disutility from entering the labor force. Yet, the rise
in employment more than offsets the decline of job seekers so that the labor force increases
gradually. The subsequent growth in the employment rate drives down u, as illustrated
in Figure 2(b). When the economy reaches the final steady-state, employment and labor
tightness are higher while the unemployment rate is smaller.
One major feature of the propagation mechanism of a deregulation shock is that the
combined effect of the elastic labor supply and endogenous markups produces a multiplicative
effect on labor market variables. As the markup depends on aggregate employment, the
increase in labor force participation, triggered by the rise in the labor market tightness (which
raises the reservation wage), reduces the markup which in turn raises further the labor market
tightness and so on. The larger the elasticity of labor supply, the greater the successive waves
of declining magnitude.
———————————————————————-
< Please insert Figure 2 about here >
———————————————————————-
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5 Deregulation Shock: A Quantitative Exploration
While the model can be solved analytically, we propose some numerical simulations to illus-
trate key theoretical results.
5.1 Baseline Parametrization
We start by discussing our calibration of the model’s parameters. The world interest rate
r? which is equal to the subjective time discount rate ρ is set to 1%. One period of time
corresponds to a quarter. Below, we analyze two different calibrations of the model, one
aimed at capturing the European labor markets “rigidities”, the other aimed at capturing the
U.S. labor markets. For these two calibrations, we present the implications of a deregulation
shock.
Our reference period for the calibration corresponds to the pre-deregulation episode, i.e.
1995-1998. While some European countries started earlier like the U.S. or the U.K., i.e. at the
end of the seventies or the beginning of the eighties, most of the European countries did not
improve competitive conditions in the product market before the signature of the Maastricht
Treaty. Further, the period over which the deregulation in product markets fastens coincides
with the entry in the euro area. More precisely, the value added weighted sum of fifteen EU
members’ product market regulations indices show that the largest decrease in the indicator
was in 1999.23 Hence, we choose 1995-1998 as the pre-deregulation period to calibrate our
model. Data are summarized in Table 4.
We start with the values of the labor market parameters which are chosen so as to match
a typical European economy. Some of the values of the labor market parameters can be
taken directly from data, but others need to be endogenously calibrated to fit a set of labor
market features. As summarized in Table 4, unemployment rate and the job finding rate
average 10% and 0.2 respectively for Europe (15). Hence, the matching efficiency parameter
M0 has been set to 0.35 and the job destruction rate s to 0.023 to target an unemployment
rate u of 10% and a quarterly job finding rate m of 0.2, in line with the data shown in
Table 4. According to estimates by Petrongolo and Pissarides [2001], the elasticity of the
matching function with respect to unemployment falls in the range of 0.3 to 0.7. We set
αV = 0.5, as it is common in the literature. Because we impose the Hosios [1990] condition,
we set the worker bargaining power αW to 0.5.24 In the numerical analysis, we assume that
23We use the aggregate indicator of regulation in energy, transport and communications. Source: Conway,
De Rosa, Nicoletti, and Steiner [2006]. Data and calculations are available from the authors.
24The empirical literature usually finds small values for the worker bargaining power. Using a panel of
French manufacturing firms, Cre´pon, Desplat Mairesse [1999] estimate that workers capture 25% of the rent
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unemployment benefits are a fixed proportion of the wage rate, i.e. BU = τUw, with τU the
replacement rate. The unemployment benefit replacement rate has been set to 65%, in line
with our estimates shown in Table 4. The next step is to choose a value for κ which reflects
the recruiting cost. To target a labor market tightness θ of 0.5, a reference value for most of
the matching literature for the U.S., we set the share of recruiting costs in GDP to 2% by
choosing κ = 0.575 when calibrating for the U.S. economy. Then we keep this value of κ for
Europe. In this case, we obtain θ = 0.35 for the baseline scenario.
To capture the U.S. labor market, we set the matching efficiency parameterM0 to 1.25 and
the job destruction rate s to 0.05 to target an unemployment rate u of 5% and a quarterly job
finding rate m of 0.9, in line with the data shown in Table 4. Furthermore, the unemployment
benefit replacement rate has been set to 55%. We keep other parameters unchanged.
Next, we turn to the parameters for which we conduct some sensitivity analysis: the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply at the extensive margin σL, and the degree of competition
in product markets as captured by the markup µ. Empirical studies based on micro data
generally report much larger values for the Frisch elasticity of labor supply on the extensive
margin than on the intensive margin. More precisely, while the former falls in the range of
0.6 to 0.8, the latter falls in the range of 0.1 to 0.5. We choose σL to be 0.5 in our baseline
setting.25 In the light of data summarized in Table 4, the markup in EU-15 countries over the
period 1995-1998 averages 1.4. We set the elasticity of substitution among sectoral goods ω
to 1 and the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods ² to 3.8 to target a markup
of 1.4.26
Numerical results are reported in Table 2. Since data show considerable heterogeneity
across European Union members, we conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to pivotal
parameters capturing the regulation of goods and labor markets. We consider six alternative
while Cahuc, Gianella, Goux and Mairesse [1998] find the workers have an average bargaining power of about
0.2. More recently, estimates by Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin [2006] show that the worker bargaining power
falls in the range between 0-40%, depending on the particular industry considered and workers’ skills. We set
αW to 0.5 but conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to this parameter, setting alternatively αW to 0.2
and 0.8.
25Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Fiorito and Zanella [2008] find that aggregate time-series
results deliver a Frisch elasticity of about 0.8, the contribution of employment (extensive margin) accounting
for about 4/5 of the aggregate elasticity. Using Japanese data, Kuroda and Yamamoto [2007] report a Frisch
elasticity on the extensive margin which falls in the range of 0.6 to 0.8 for both sexes.
26Due to the lack of empirical evidence regarding the elasticity of substitution among sectoral goods ω, we
set this parameter to 1 and choose a value for ² to target a markup of 1.4. In our baseline setting, the choice
of parameter values implies a share of fixed cost in GDP of 28%. This value is close to the ratio chosen by
Jaimovich and Floetotto [2008]. Furthermore, consumption expenditure and government spending, as a share
of initial GDP are 57% and 20%, respectively.
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scenarios: benchmark parametrization (i. e. , σL = 0.5, αW = 0.5, ² = 3.8), a larger worker
bargaining power (i. e. , αW = 0.8), a smaller worker bargaining power (i. e. , αW = 0.2),
poorly competitive product markets (i. e. , ² = 2.5), a weakly responsive labor force (i. e. ,
σL = 0.2), a highly responsive labor force (i. e. , σL = 1).27 The seventh column displays the
results for the calibration aimed at capturing the United States.
5.2 Calibrating the Deregulation Shock
We are interested in evaluating the size of unemployment effects triggered by a decline in
product market regulation, captured by a fall in fixed costs in our theoretical framework. To
calibrate the size of the deregulation shock, we adopt the following strategy. We estimate
by how much the markup falls following a decrease in the product market regulation. To do
so, we choose a particular deregulation phase in the EU-15 countries, corresponding to the
period ranging from 1999 to 2005. During this period, EU-15 countries have experienced their
fastest deregulation episode, measured by the OECD non-manufacturing regulatory index.
More precisely, the weighted sum of fifteen EU members’ PMR indices has decreased by 1
unit, i.e. from 2.8 to 1.8, which corresponds to the fastest decline in this index during the last
thirty years.28 Hence, when we simulate the model, we consider a fall in fixed costs which
lowers the markup by the same amount equivalent to the above mentioned drop in the PMR
index. In adopting this strategy, we believe that we can get some sense of the magnitude of
the effects that the fall in fixed costs we consider in numerical experiments might generate.
Following a vast empirical literature (see e.g., Tybout [2003], Griffith et al. [2007], Boulhol
[2010]), we use price-cost margins as a proxy of market power. We compute the price-cost
margin denoted by µ as value added over the sum of labor cost plus capital cost, all variables
measured in current prices:29
µijt =
Value addedijt
Labor Costsijt +Capital Costsijt
, (56)
where i indexes countries, j the sector and t years.
Our strategy is to evaluate how much the markup has decreased in Europe as a result
of the deregulation movement in the product markets. To do so, we regress the markup on
27Setting ² to 2.5 yields a markup of 1.7.
28Calculations are available from the authors.
29An important advantage of price-cost margin as a measure of market power is that it can vary both
across industries and over time. An alternative approach would be to estimate the markups by applying the
methodology developed by Roeger [1995]. One problem with this approach is that the time dimension would
be sacrificed. The drawback of estimating markups by using price-cost margins is that this measured of market
power is biased downwards in the presence of increasing returns to scale, see Roeger [1995].
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indicators of product market regulation. To capture the intensity of regulation over time,
we use the time-series regulatory indicators in product market provided by OECD. These
regulatory indicators measure on a scale from 0 to 6 restrictions on competition, in particular
barriers of entry and public ownership, which are available for two 1-digit ISIC-rev.3 industries,
namely Electricity, gas, and water supply and Transport, storage and communications. Our
sample includes 16 OECD countries and covers the period 1985-2003.30 For these countries,
the price-cost margins average 1.1 and 1.3 in Transport, communication and Electricity, gas,
and water supply, respectively. We run regressions from 1985 until 2003, except specifications
(3) and (4) where data for bargaining coverage end in 2000.
Labor market institutions also influence the price-cost margin by affecting the worker
bargaining power and the reservation wage.31 Following Griffith et al. [2007], we explore the
following relationship empirically:
µijt = fi + gj + tt + PMRijtβ′1 + LMRitβ
′
2 +Xijtβ
′
3 + ²ijt, (57)
where PMR represents a set of of time, country, and sector varying indicators of product
market regulations, LMR contains a set of time and country varying indicators of labor
market regulations and institutions, and X represents a set of controls, including a measure
of the deviation of sectoral output from trend and the change in the sectoral inflation rate.
Indicators of labor market regulations and institutions include: tax wedge, replacement rate
of unemployment benefits, employment protection legislation, union coverage, coordination.
Country fixed effects are captured by country dummies, fi, sectoral fixed effects by sector
dummies, gj , and common macroeconomic shocks by year dummies, tt.
The estimation method which has been used is based on standard panel data techniques,
using Driscoll and Kraay [1998] standard errors for the estimated coefficients.32 Results are
reported in Table 1. We restrict our comments of the results related to variables in our model.
In column (1), we regress the price-cost margin on the indicator of product market regulation
without controls for labor market regulations. Our panel data estimations suggest that a 1
unit decrease in PMR lowers the markup by 0.028 percentage points. In column (2), we add
30These countries are: AUS, AUT, BEL, CAN, DEU, DNK, FIN, FRA, GBR, ITA, NLD, NOR, NZL, SPA,
SWE, USA.
31Boulhol [2010] analyzes the determinants of price-cost margins at sector manufacturing level for OECD
countries between 1970 and 2003. Constructing a static theoretical framework with monopolistic competition
and imperfect labor markets, Boulhol establishes that the higher the worker bargaining power and the stronger
the intensity of competition, the lower the price-cost margin. Additionally, an increase in the tax wedge or in
the replacement rate raises the reservation wage which should result in a smaller markup.
32According to Driscoll and Kraay [1998], these standard errors are robust to very general forms of cross-
sectional as well as temporal dependence, which may very likely plague our macro level variables.
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controls for the labor markets which amplify the fall in the markup up to 0.033 percentage
points. Employment protection legislation has the expected sign and is significant. In column
(3), we add bargaining coverage and the coordination index as labor market controls. Their
coefficients have the expected sign but only the bargaining coverage has a significant impact
(at 1%) on µ. In column (4), we split the regulatory index in two indicators, namely public
ownership and cost of entry. Interestingly, both measures raise significantly the markup,
public ownership exerting the strongest impact.33
Following these empirical results, the price-cost margin response to a product market
regulation falls in the range of 2.8 to 3.3 percentage points over the period 1985-2003. In
the sequel, when simulating the model, we will adopt a fall in fixed costs which reduces the
markup by 3 percentage points.
———————————————————————-
< Please insert Table 1 about here >
———————————————————————-
5.3 Long-Run and Dynamic Effects of Deregulation in Product Markets
We now discuss the quantitative effects of a deregulation shock. The rise in the intensity of
competition following the decline in fixed costs lowers the markup from 1.4 to about 1.37 in
the baseline scenario.
Long-Run Effects
In panel A of Table 2 we report numerical results for long-run effects of a deregulation
shock. The subsequent increase in employment falls in the range between 0.45% of initial
steady-state labor force if σL = 0.2 and 2.75% if σL = 1. As stressed previously, the in-
teraction between endogenous labor force participation and endogenous markups produces a
multiplicative effect on employment. The more responsive the labor supply at the extensive
margin, the larger the successive increases in θ of declining magnitude, the greater the long-
33In all cases, the replacement rate is significant but has an unexpected sign. A possible explanation to
this fact could be that higher unemployment benefits lower the labor market tightness which in turn reduces
the reservation wage and thereby raises the markup. As long as all controls for labor market institutions
are included, the coefficient associated to tax wedge has the predicted sign but is never significant. In all
specifications, a change in the inflation rate has a negative effect on the price-cost margin and is statistically
significant in specifications (3) and (4), i.e. when all labor market controls are included in the regression.
According to the predictions of the model developed by Boulhol [2010], the negative impact of the change in
the inflation rate on price-cost margins could be explained by price-stickiness. Finally, according to estimates
by Nekarda and Ramey [2010], we expect procyclical markups. Yet, perhaps due to the specificity of the
sectors, our regressions fail to detect a systematic and statistically positive impact on price-cost margins.
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run rise in labor. Furthermore, the combined effect of the decline in the markup reflecting a
rise in the labor cost paid by intermediate-good producers (due to additional labor demand)
and the increase in the reservation wage raises significantly the Nash bargaining wage w. As
shown in the seventh line, the wage growth increases from 1.96% to 2.84% as σL is raised from
0.2 to 1. The fifth line of Panel A indicates that by and large, the number of job seekers U
remains almost unchanged because the inflow in unemployment is offset by the outflow from
unemployment.
The decline in the unemployment rate (i.e., u˜ ≡ 1 − l˜) is moderated, namely between
0.06 and 0.22 percentage point. This finding is in line with the result reached by Ebell and
Haefke [2009]. Yet, in our model, all or the major part of the fall in u can be attributed to
the increased labor force. Numerical results show that the workers’ bargaining power play a
pivotal role. Raising αW from 0.2 to 0.8 amplifies the decline in the unemployment rate from
0.06 to 0.22 percentage points of the labor force. The reason is that as workers obtain a larger
share of the surplus, they are more willing to supply labor. By reducing further the markup,
this effect compensates the fact that the employment agency receives a smaller share of the
surplus from hiring. Moreover, we find that the unemployment rate is weakly sensitive to
the elasticity of labor supply at the extensive margin. The reason is that raising σL amplifies
substantially the inflow in unemployment, as shown in the fifth line of Table 2.
The numbers shown in the first and the seventh column of Table 2 compares the change
of labor market variables for a calibration capturing Europe and the U.S., respectively. By
and large, beneficial effects in labor market outcomes are larger in Europe than in the United
States. In particular, a deregulation shock results in a smaller decline in the U.S. unem-
ployment rate than that in Europe, i.e. 0.05 rather than 0.1 percentage point. On the one
hand, a lower unemployment benefit replacement rate provides a greater incentive to supply
more labor following an increase in the reservation wage, i.e. χ˜ is larger in the U.S. than in
Europe in our baseline calibration. This effect amplifies the decline in the unemployment rate
after a deregulation shock. On the other hand, a lower initial steady-state unemployment
rate u˜ implies a smaller elasticity of the employment rate to labor market tightness (keeping
unchanged reservation wage). According to numerical results, the latter effect predominates
which results in a larger impact on employment. As a result, labor market tightness increases
more in Europe which amplifies the rise in the Nash bargaining wage (2.25% rather than
2.07%) by raising further the reservation wage.
Numerical results also show that consumption increases substantially, ranging from 1.7%
of initial GDP to almost 4% (see the last line of panel A of Table 2). The rise in consumption
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comes from higher labor income and higher dividends paid by the employment agency to
households.
———————————————————————-
< Please insert Table 2 about here >
———————————————————————-
———————————————————————-
< Please insert Figure 3 about here >
———————————————————————-
Dynamic Effects
In panel B of Table 2 we report numerical results for impact effects. The computed
transitional paths of key variables under the baseline scenario (solid line) are displayed in
Figure 3 and are compared to alternative scenarios. The dashed line shows results for smaller
worker bargaining power, the dashed-dotted line for an economy with initially low intensity of
competition in product markets, and the thin solid line for a higher elasticity of labor supply
at the extensive margin. The responses of labor market variables are expressed in percent of
initial steady-state labor force, with the exception of the Nash bargaining wage and the firm
size which are expressed in percentage deviation from its initial steady state. Flow of entry
corresponds to the deviation of the current number of firms from its initial steady-state value.
Horizontal axes measure quarters.
The cut in overhead costs creates profit opportunities which induces new firms to enter
the market. Because the number of firms is a jump variable, the markup falls abruptly. The
consecutive increase in labor demand provides an incentive to post job vacancies, and more
so in economies with a small worker bargaining power or a highly responsive labor force
participation. As summarized in Table 2, job vacancies rises by 1.84% and 1.15% of initial
labor force if αW = 0.2 or σL = 1, respectively, while V/LP increases by 0.50% in the baseline
scenario. In the former case (i.e. αW = 0.2), the employment agency receives a larger share
of the surplus which provides a stronger incentive to post more job vacancies. In the latter
case (i.e. σL = 1), because labor force participation is more elastic, employment increases
more which lowers further the markup and thereby raises labor demand by a larger amount.
As shown in the fourth line of Table 2, because the higher reservation wage provides an
incentive to participate in the labor market, the unemployment rate increases sharply; the rise
of u ranges from 0.36 to 2.50 percentage points as σL is raised from 0.2 to 1. Increasing σL
amplifies the number of job seekers while labor remains unchanged on impact as L is initially
predetermined. Furthermore, the wage rate rises substantially on impact, and more so in
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economies with higher workers’ bargaining power, initially poorly competitive product mar-
kets, or strongly responsive labor supply. If product markets are initially strongly regulated, µ
falls further as the elasticity of the markup to entry is larger. Hence, labor demand increases
more which raises further the Nash bargaining wage. It is worth noting that a deregulation
shock lowers significantly the firm size on impact as employment remains unchanged while
entry of new firms lowers output per firm.
Over time, employment builds up which creates profit opportunities, as depicted in Figure
3(a). Hence, as illustrated in Figure 3(g), the number of firms increases which results in a
decline in the markup. As a consequence, the employment agency posts job vacancies so that
the labor market tightness increases monotonically over time, as displayed in Figure 3(b).
The consecutive rise in the reservation wage induces agents to supply more labor. The inflow
in unemployment pursues, though it slows down over time (see Figure 3(d)). As illustrated
in Figure 3(e), after its initial upward jump, the unemployment rate declines over time as
employment keeps on increasing along the transitional path. Importantly, the unemployment
rate exceeds its original value over almost twelve quarters (i.e. three years). Figure 3(f) shows
that the combined effect of an increasing reservation wage and a declining markup, the latter
resulting in greater labor demand, pushes up the Nash bargaining wage. Production expands
which raises firm size along the transitional path, as shown in Figure 3(h).
5.4 Deregulation in Product Markets and the Labor Share
Blanchard and Giavazzi [2003] find that a deregulation shock has a positive impact on the
share of labor income in output. We confirm this result numerically, though the long-run
response of the labor share remains fairly muted.
To write out the shares of profit and labor income in GDP, we have to remember that
overall profit plus labor income is equal to output less total fixed costs and the cost of recruiting
(see eq. (31)):
NpiP +ΠH + wL = Y −Nϕ− κV ≡ Q.
Denoting by Π ≡ NpiP +ΠH overall profits, the share of labor income is given by:
wL
Q
= 1− Π
Q
. (58)
The labor share may fall or rise depending on whether the increase in labor income wL is
larger or smaller than that of Q. Numerical results provided in the eighth line of panel A
of Table 2 show that the steady-state labor share never decreases in all scenarios, but rather
remains fairly stable.
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By contrast, in the short-run, the labor share wL/Q rises substantially, and more so in
countries where the workers’ bargaining power is smaller, product markets are initially highly
regulated, labor supply at the extensive margin is higher. As αW is reduced, net output Q
increases much less as the cost of hiring absorbs more resources because V rises further. If
competition in product markets is initially low, a deregulation shock shifts the labor demand
by a larger amount which results in higher wages. Raising the elasticity of labor supply pushes
up further the reservation wage as θ increases more.
The figures shown in the first and the seventh column of Table 2 compare the change of
the labor share for a calibration capturing European and the U.S. labor markets, respectively.
Whereas in the former case, as stressed above, the unemployment rate declines more and the
product wage rises further, the labor share increases less than in the United States.34
6 Conclusion
High rates of unemployment remain a key policy concern across many European countries.
While labor market institutions have received a lot of attention as the main determinant of
unemployment, recent empirical evidence suggest that the degree of regulation in the product
markets is an important cause of unemployment. In this paper, we illuminate the dynamic link
between product market regulation and unemployment by introducing search unemployment
and endogenous markups. In contrast to the previous literature, (i) we derive analytically
the condition for saddle-path stability, (ii) fully characterize the transitional paths, and (iii)
determine the role of labor market parameters in driving the magnitude of the effects of
a deregulation shock, (iv) calibrate the deregulation shock by estimating the relationship
between the markup and the product market regulation index provided by OECD.
One major contribution of the paper is to show that a deregulation shock raises labor and
lowers the unemployment rate as long as the condition for saddle-path stability is fulfilled.
When product markets are initially relatively uncompetitive, instability could emerge and
result in detrimental effects on labor market outcomes. If the condition for saddle-path sta-
bility holds, employment increases gradually while the unemployment rate rises substantially
on impact. Along the transitional path, the combined effect of labor supply and endogenous
markups triggers a multiplicative employment effect which amplifies the beneficial effects on
labor market outcomes.
Numerical simulations stress three major points. First, both labor and product market
34The reason is that in the latter case, the employment agency posts more job vacancies and the markup
falls less which result in a smaller increase in net output Q.
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parameters play a pivotal role in driving short-term and long-term effects of a deregulation
episode. Countries with higher worker bargaining power and stringent anti-competitive prod-
uct market regulation would experience larger benefits from improving competitive conditions
in goods market. Yet, numerical experiments show that the unemployment rate rises sub-
stantially in the short-run and remains higher than its original level over about two years,
before decreasing below its original level. Second, due to endogenous labor force participation,
the number of job seekers remains almost unchanged because the inflow in unemployment is
offset by the outflow from unemployment. The increase in the labor force triggered by higher
employment drives down the steady-state unemployment rate, falling in the range between
0.06 and 0.22 percentage point. Third, numerical results show that the increase in the labor
share is substantial in the short-run but remains insignificant in the long-run.
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Table 1: The Impact of Product Market Regulation on Price-cost Margin
Dependent variable Price-cost Margin
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Period 85-03 85-03 85-00 85-00
Product market regulation 0.02882*** 0.03321*** 0.05175***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Public ownership 0.04577***
(0.007)
Cost of entry -0.00190
(0.011)
∆ Sectoral inflation -0.00004 -0.00005 -0.00365*** -0.00319***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Sectoral output gap 0.16497 0.19178 -0.08930 0.01233
(0.137) (0.139) (0.121) (0.169)
Tax wedge 0.14284 -0.00810 -0.11845
(0.235) (0.162) (0.159)
Employ. protec. legislation -0.03294*** -0.05639** -0.05404*
(0.012) (0.025) (0.027)
Replacement rate 0.00183** 0.00419* 0.00607**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Bargaining coverage -0.00319*** -0.00426***
(0.001) (0.001)
Coordination index -0.02199 -0.01967
(0.021) (0.025)
Observations 586 586 114 114
Number of countries 16 16 16 16
Number of sectors 2 2 2 2
Notes: Fixed effects (sector-country) regressions, using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors
in parentheses; ? significant at 10%; ?? significant at 5%; ? ? ? significant at 1%.
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(g) Firm entry
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Figure 3: Computed transitional paths
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A Data Description
A.1 Data for Empirical Analysis
Our sample consists of a panel of 16 countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United
States) and covers the period 1985-2003, for two 1-digit ISIC-rev.3 industries (Electricity, gas and
water supply, and Transport, communication and storage).
• Unemployment benefit replacement rate: Gross benefit replacement rates data which cover the
period 1985-2003 with one observation every two years for each country. The OECD summary
measure is defined as the average of the gross unemployment benefit replacement rates for two
earnings levels, three family situations and three durations of unemployment. Source: OECD,
Benefits and Wages Database.
• Price-cost margin: Computed as value added over total cost, both measured at current prices.
Total cost is equal to the labor cost plus capital cost. To compute the price-cost margin, we use
the following variables for:
1. Value added at current prices. Source: OECD STAN database.
2. Labor costs: Compensation of employees. Source: OECD STAN database.
3. Cost of capital. Long-term interest rates minus inflation rate, plus assumed depreciation of
15%. Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators for long-term interest rates and consumer
price index. Capital stocks have been calculated using the perpetual inventory method.
Source: OECD STAN database.
• Tax wedge: This consists of the employment tax rate plus the direct tax rate. The employment
tax rate is the ratio between employers’ social security contributions and total compensation for
employees net of employers’ social security contributions. The direct tax is the ratio between the
income tax plus employees’ social security contributions and household current receipts. Source:
Faggio and Nickell [2006].
• Employment protection legislation (EPL): This index, developed by the OECD, covers the pe-
riod 1985-2003, and is designed as a multi-dimensional indicator of the strictness of legal pro-
tection against dismissals for permanent as well as temporary workers. The higher is EPL, the
more restricted is a country’s employment protection regulation. Source: OECD labour market
statistics database.
• Collective bargaining coverage: The percentage of the employed labor force whose pay is deter-
mined by collective agreement. It ranges from 1985 to 2000, by 5-year period intervals. Source:
Nickell et al. [2005] for 1985-1994 and OECD, Employment Outlook [2004] for 2000.
• Coordination of wage bargaining: This index describes the coordination level in the wage setting.
It ranges from 1 to 5, and the most coordinated countries have index equal to 5. (5:economy-
wide bargaining; 4:mixed industry and economy-wide bargaining; 3:industry bargaining; 2:mixed
industry- and firm level bargaining; 1: fragmented bargaining, mostly at company level). It
covers the period 1985-2003. Source: ICTWSS (Jelle Visser [2009]).
• Product market regulation (PMR): To capture the intensity of regulation over time, we use the
time-series regulatory indicators in product market provided by OECD for seven non manufac-
turing industries. These regulatory indicators are measured on a scale from 0 to 6. The PMR
indicators which are used to estimate the relationship (57) have been chosen because they are
available over the whole period 1985-2003 for the 16 OECD countries of our sample, unlike the
economy-wide indicator which covers only three years (1998, 2003, 2008). One drawback is that
the PMR indicator covers only seven non-manufacturing industries (Airlines, Telecoms, Electric-
ity, Gas, Post, Rail, Road). Since data for Gross fixed capital formation, necessary to calculate
price-cot margins, are not available at such disaggregated level, we have decided to aggregate
up from 2-digit to the following 1-digit ISIC-rev.3 industries: Electricity, gas and water supply,
and Transport, communication and storage. Source: Conway, De Rosa, Nicoletti, and Steiner
[2006].
• Change in sectoral inflation: Change in growth of the sectoral value added deflators. It covers
the period 1985-2003. Source: KLEMS database [2009] and OECD STAN database (for NZL
and NOR).
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics (1985-2003)
mean s.d.
Sector (ISIC-Rev.3) E I E I
Price-cost margin 1.29 1.13 0.37 0.17
Product market regulation 4.13 4.06 1.25 1.41
Cost of entry 4.38 3.96 1.64 1.66
Public ownership 3.46 4.79 1.56 1.27
∆ Inflation -0.68 0.34 8.31 7.69
Output gap 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.03
Tax wedge 0.29 0.29 0.09 0.09
Empl. protect. legisl. 2.01 2.01 1.01 1.01
Replacement rate 29.77 29.77 13.04 13.04
Bargaining coverage 71.94 71.94 24.31 24.31
Coordination 3.01 3.01 1.36 1.36
Notes: E: Electricity, gas and water supply; I: Transport, storage and communications.
Table 4: Data to Calibrate the Model (1995-1998)
Countries Labor market Markup
u m τU µ
AUT 4.3 n.a. 65.1 1.08
BEL 9.5 0.10 65.3 1.30
DNK 5.8 0.26 98.9 1.26
FIN 13.5 n.a. 76.6 1.32
FRA 11.2 0.19 62.7 1.26
DEU 8.8 0.20 61.1 1.19
GRE 9.9 0.15 56.2 2.33
IRL 10.3 0.11 48.2 1.74
ITA 11.2 0.08 38.5 1.66
LUX 2.8 0.23 n.a. 1.55
NDL 5.8 0.13 73.9 1.29
PRT 6.5 0.11 72.1 1.32
SPA 17.0 0.11 77.2 1.37
SWE 9.1 0.58 55.5 1.34
GBR 7.3 0.30 52.3 1.34
EU-15 10.0 0.20 64.6 1.42
USA 5.1 0.90 57.0 1.50
Notes: u is the harmonized unemployment rate; m is the job finding
rate; τU is the unemployment benefit replacement rate; markup is the
price-total cost margin. EU-15 represents (weighted) averages of the
corresponding variables.
• Sectoral output gap: Deviation of sectoral output from trend. Sectoral value added in volume
has been logged and detrended using an Hodrick-Prescott filter with the smoothing parameter
set at 100. It covers the period 1985-2003. Source: KLEMS database [2009] and OECD STAN
database (for NZL and NOR).
Summary statistics of the data used in the empirical analysis are displayed in Table 3.
A.2 Data for Calibration
We now describe the data employed to calibrate the model. We use two calibrations aimed at capturing
the European and the U.S. labor and product markets. The data consists of 16 countries, including
the fifteen European countries and the U.S. and are averages of the period 1995-1998. Our sample
covers Manufacturing including energy and Business sector services. Summary statistics of the data
used in the numerical analysis are displayed in Table 4.
• Unemployment rate denoted by u: Unemployed (workers as share of the labor force), in %.
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Average EU-15 unemployment rate shown in Table 4 is the working age population weighted
sum of fifteen EU members’ unemployment rates. Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators.
• Job finding rate denoted by m: Monthly job finding rate come from Hobijn and Sahin [2007].
We compute the equivalent quarterly rate as x+ (1− x)x+ (1− x)2x, where x is the monthly
job finding rate.
• Unemployment benefit replacement rate denoted by τU : Average of replacement rates for un-
employed persons who earned 67% and 100% of average worker earnings at the time of losing
job (first year of unemployment). Source: OECD, Benefits and Wages Database.
• Price-cost margin is denoted by µ calculated as the ratio value added over total cost. Further
details of calculation are described above. Average EU-15 price-cost margin shown in Table 4 is
the value added weighted sum of fifteen EU members’ price-cost margins. Source: OECD STAN
database.
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